Both the ECB and national central banks are independent in performing their tasks.
Functional independence implies that ECB, in order to meet its primary objective of price stability, has at its disposal all instruments and competencies necessary for the conduct of an efficient monetary policy and is authorised to decide autonomously how and when to use them.
Institutional independence implies that neither the ECB nor the national central banks (NCBs), nor any member of their decision-making bodies, are allowed to seek or take instructions from European Community institutions or bodies, from any government of an EU Member State or from any other body. At the same time, Community institutions, governments and bodies are forbidden to give instructions or, in any other way, to influence the ECB's decision-making bodies or the national central banks.
Personal independence implies a minimum term of office for NCB governors of five years (with a possiblity of re-appointment) and a non-renewable term of office of eight years for members of the Executive Board of the ECB. In addition, the members of the decision-making bodies cannot be removed from office, except in the cases provided for by the ESCB and ECB Statute.
Financial independence implies that the ECB and national central banks must be capable of providing, independently, sufficient financial resources for fulfilling its tasks. The ECB has its own capital, subscribed and paid up by the NCBs and it also has its own budget, kept separate from that of other EU institutions. The national central banks also must have sufficient financial resources for carrying out their tasks, both their own and those related to the ESCB.